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Cause Of Action In New Mexico
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TURNING BLOOD INTO WHINE - "FEAR OF AIDS" AS A COGNIZABLE CAUSE
OF ACTION IN NEW MEXICO
I. INTRODUCTION

Madrid v. Lincoln Countv Medical center' is the first New Mexico case to recognize a
cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) arising from possible
exposure to the virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). The court in
Madrid held that recognition of emotional distress claims arising out of a negligently created fear
of contracting the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) through a medically sound channel of
transmission does not require proof of actual exposure to the virus.' In other words, it matters not
whether the suspected conduit of disease transmission actually carries HIV at the time of the
alleged exposure incident?
With the Madrid decision, New Mexico join%a minority of jurisdictions that allow

recovery for emotional distress arising fiom fear of possibly developing AIDS regardless of the
threat posed by the actual transmission of H I V . ~
In arriving at its decision, the Madrid court

' 122N.M. 269,923 P 2 d 1154 (1996).
See id. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159.
To wit, there may be circumstances under which exposure may be presumed.
&(reciting the analysis from
Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (N.J.Super. Ct. App Div. 1996), affd and modified in Dart, 696
A
...2d
- - 14
. . CN I 1997))
- - - .,.
4
See Marchica v. Long Island RR., 3 1 F.3d 1197 (2d Cu. 1994); Bordelon v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp., 640 So. 2d
4 7 6 < ~ a Ct.
. App. 1994); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J.
1997); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991). SeeJames Cahoy, New Mexico
Su~remeCourt Allows 'Fear of AIDS' Suit in Absence of Proof of Exvosure, 9-18-96 WLN 9845, at I, available in
1996 WL 524414 ("Going against the prevailing legal trend, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled.. . that
plaintiffs may sue for 'fear of AIDS' if they have reason to believe they have been exposed to the virus--even if they
have no proof of actual exposure,"). The Marchica case has been distinguished 6om the other "fear of AIDS" cases
because it involved a claim brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), see 45 U.S.C. $5 5 1-60
(1994), which employs a "more relaxed negligence standard." See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553,560 n.9
(Minn. 1995). Additionally, the decision from Castro is contrary to subsequent holdings 60m otherNew York
courts.
Brown v. New Yolk City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880,886 (App. Div. 1996);
Druly v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668,674 n.l l (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); NY ADD.Div. A f f m s
Dismissal of HIV Fear Suit for Lack of Ex~osureProof, 1997 Andrews AIDS Litig. Rep. 17167 (April 11, 1997)
(discussing the decision in Montalbano v. Tri-Mac Enterprises, 652 N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 1997)). With the
Madrid decision, New Mexico joins Maryland and New Jersey as the only jurisdictions in which the highest court
pennits recovery in the absence of actual exposure. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 560 n.9; AIDS Update, 14 No. 9
Med. Malpractice L. & Strategy 3 (July, 1997); Kathy Barrett Carter, AIDS Fear. Not Virus. Enough for Lawsuit
Supreme Court Rules for Cleaning Woman Cut by Surgical Knife, Star-Ledger. July 22, 1997, at I, available in
1997 WL 12543822.
3--
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rejected the tort-recovery principles formulated in the "fear of future disease" cases.' Instead, the
court applied the traditional "physical impact" rule and reasoned that one's fear of developing
AIDS in the future is a rational concern-irrespective

of actual HIV exposure-so

long as there

exists a medically recognized mode of transmi~sion.~
The implications of this decision go beyond concerns over excessive litigation,
genuineness of claims, and the reasonableness of claimants' fears. The court's decision
unnecessarily contributes to the gratuitous phobia that continues to surround AIDS, and
promotes irrational beliefs concerning the manner and facility of HIV transmission. This Note
reviews the evolution and current understanding ofjudicial tests for NIED analysis, questions the
rationale employed by the Madrid court in its opinion, and discusses the implications fiom
Madrid of recognizing a cause of action for emotional distress arising out of a fear ofpossibly
developing AIDS, absent proof of actual HIV exposure.

-

11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 28,1992, Sonia Madrid was transporting medical samples, including
blood products, fiom Lincoln County Medical Center in Ruidoso, New Mexico to laboratory
u some
e . ~ point in transit, Madrid's hands were splashed with bloody
facilities in ~ l b u ~ u e r ~At
fluid leaking from two to four sample containers.' The sample containers were inspected when
they arrived in Albuquerque and only a single container was determined to have leaked fluid.
Madrid claims that unheded paper cuts present on her hands at the time of the incident came into
contact with the bloody fluid. Aware of the widespread publicity surrounding AIDS, Madrid

More specifically, the "fear of cancer." See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 275,923 P.2d at 1160 (discussing the reasoning,
holding, and application of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993)). See generally Foumier
J. Gale, 111 & James L. Goyer, 111, Recovew for Canceruhobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 Cumb. L. Rev. 723
(1 985).
'See Madrid. 122N.M. at 278,923 P.2d at 1163.
'The facts are paraphrased from the oourt of appeals opinion in Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr,, 121 N.M. 133,
135-36,909 P.2d 14,16-17 (Ct. App.), cert. eranted. 120 N.M. 828,907 P.2d 1009 (1995), and affd, remanded, 122
N.M. 269,923 P.2d 1154 (1996).
It is unclear h m the fact pattern where the containers were located during transport, and how the leaking fluid
came into contact with the plaintiffs hands.

'

knew that it was possible to contract the causative virus (HIV) through contact between open
wounds and bodily fluids, primarily HIV-infected blood.
After the incident, Madrid consulted a physician who advised her that due to the variable
latency periodg of the virus she should be tested periodically over the next six months to a year.
The recommendation was made without knowing whether the culprit blood sample was HIVpositive or HIV-negative. Not until two months later did Madrid learn that the patient with
whose blood she had been splattered tested HIV-negative. However, because her physician
instructed her to get tested several times, Madrid felt that the single test result from the source
was inconclusive, ever] if it was negative. Furthermore, believing that more than one sample had
leaked, she thought necessary additional testing of those sample sources a s well. Not until
Lincoln County MedicaI Center filed an affidavit nearly two years after the incident did she learn
that only one specimen had leaked, and that it was HIV-negative. Pursuant to advice from her

-

physician, Madrid was prophylactically inoculated against hepatitis A and B. She was also tested
for HIV at periodic intervals over a span of six months. Test results for this time period all came
back HIV-negative.
Madrid sued Lincoln County Medical Center for NIED arising from her fear that she
might have contracted HIV as a result of being negligently exposed to bloody fluid of unknown
origin. She sought damages for medical and other expenses, lost wages, and for pain and
suffering. The Medical Center moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
The district court agreed with the rule adopted by the majority of other jurisdictions "that actual
exposure to HIV is a threshold requirement in any claim for emotional-distress damages arising

9

--.

The term "latency period" has been used to refer to both the time lapse between initial HIV infection and the onset
of symptomatic AIDS disease, see Jessamine R. Talavera, Quintana v. United Blood Services: Examining Industry
Practice in Transfusion-Related AIDS Cases, 2 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 475,519 n.11 (1993), and thetime
between initial HIV infection and the development of HIV antibodies, see Joycelyn L. Cole, AIDS-Phobia: Are
Emotional Distress Damages for a Fear ofAlDS a Leeallv Cornpensable Iniw?, 19 T. Marshall L. Rev. 333,337
(1994).

out of a fear of having contracted AIDS."" The New Mexico Court of Appeals subsequently

-

reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment While acknowledging that the majority
ofjurisdictions throughout the United States had adopted the "actual exposure" rule, the court of
appeals nonetheless concluded that "threshold proof of the presence of H N in the diseasetransmitting agent would not be required."" The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the
court of appeals' decision holding that proof of actual exposure to HIV was not required lo
sustain a cause of action for NTED based on a fear of developing AIDS provided a medically
sound channel of transmission exists."
111. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
In terms of a cause of action for emotional distress arising from a negligently created fear
of contracting HIV and possibly developing AIDS, Madrid represents a case of first impression
in New ~ e x i c o . "While rules governing recovery for NIED in the context of bystander-liability

--

have been repeatedly addressed and modified by New Mexico case law,I4 there exists little
guidance from the courts concerning the application of purely traditional elements of NIED."
Therefore, the absence of prior direction on this topic from the New Mexico courts and

lo
I1

See Madrid. 122 N.M. at 270-71,923 P.2d at 1155-56.
See id. at 271,923 P.2d at 1156 (citing Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133,138,909 P.2d 14, 19
--

(Ct. App. 1995)).
IZ See id. at 269,923 P.2d at 1 154.
l 3 -- at 271,923 P.2d at 1156 ("New Mexico precedent is not determinative of this case.").
" See Gabaldon v. Jay-Bi Property Management, Inc., 122 N.M. 393,925 P.2d 510 (1996); Flores v. Baca, 117
~ . K 3 0 6 , 8 7 P.2d
1 962 (1994); Solon v. WEK Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 829 P.2d 645 (1992); Folz v. State, 110
N.M. 457,797 P.2d 246 (1990); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538,673 P.2d 822 (1983); Acosta v. Castle
Constr., Inc., 117 N.M. 28, 868 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1994); Lucero v. Salazar, 117 N.M. 803, 877 P.2d 1106 (Ct.
App. 1994); Dawson v. Wilheit, I05 N.M. 734,737 P.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1987); Zamora v. Creamland Dairies, Inc.,
106 N.M. 628,747 P.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1987): Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227,668 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1983).
15
The court in Madrid made it clear that the case before it was not a bystander-liability case. See Madrid, 122 N.M.
at 271,923 P.2d at I 156. Notwithstanding, the court spent a considerable portion of its opinion explaining its prior
bystander-liability decisions because "the Court of Appeals' reliance on bystander cases and their related rationale.
. require[d] [the Court] to clarify apparent confusion in terminology and in policies applicable to recovery for
emotional distress." Seeid. The court of appeals' dependence on bystander-liability precedent may be due, in part:
to the fact that only New Mexico cases addressing bystander liability and intentional infliction of emotional distress
exist-precedent addressing non-bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress and "fear of future disease"
cases do not. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court had previously noted that emotional distress outside the
bystander context is compensable under traditional principles of negligence.
Folz. 110 N.M. at 471,797 P.2d at
260 (citing Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278,280 (Ohio 1987)).

=id.

generalized ignorance about HIV and AIDS impels both a review of the etiology of A I D S ' ~and

-

an overview of traditional NIED analysis.

A.

The Etiology O~AIDS"

The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is an inevitably fatal infectious disease."
AIDS first came to the attention of the United States' medical community in 1981 following the
discovery of several cases of rare skin tumors and lung infections in otherwise healthy
homosexual men.19 Similar maladies were subsequently observed in intravenous drug users and
hemophiliacs.20Taken together, these findings hinted at a blood-borne and sexually transmitted
infectious entity?' Between 1983 and 1984, French and American scientists independently
discovered the causative agent-a

retrovirus22now universally known as the human

~ it gains access to its human host, HIV preferentially
immunodeficiency virus ( H I V ) . ~Once

enters specialized white blood cells (CD4 cells) responsible for defending the body against
-.

pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria, fungi, and v i r ~ s e s ?HIV
~ commandeers the
metabolic machinery of CD4 cells, turning them into factories for the production of more
infectious HIV particles-destroying the host cells in the process, and releasing hundreds of new

-

l6 See,Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880, 884 (App. Div. 1996) ("Any
discussion of the elements of proof of a claim for damages based on the fear of contracting AIDS must be grounded
on medical facts about the disease and its transmission.").
" For a thorough scientific and medical overview of HIV and AIDS, see generally Alexandra M. Levine, Acquired
lmmunodeficiencv Svndrome: The Facts, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 423 (1991).
See Mervyn F. Silverman, AIDS Medical Education for Lawvers. Judges, and Legislators. in AIDS and the
courts 27,32 (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990).
l9 See Myron E. Essex, Origin of Acquired Immunodeficienc~Syndrome. in AIDS: Etiology, Diagnosis,
~ r z m e nand
t Prevention 3 , 3 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. eds., 4th ed. 1997); Alvin E. Friedman-Kien &
Kenneth H. Maya, An Overview of the Acquired lmmunodeficiencv Svndrome. in Color Atlas of AIDS 1 , 2
(Tracy Tucker ed., 1989); Dennis H. Osmond, Surveillance of U.S. Cases: Characteristics and Trends, in The AIDS
Knowledge Base 1.2-1, 1.2-1 (P.T. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
20
See Essex,
note 19, at 3.
21 See id.. suDra note 19, at 4.
22 Retroviruses are viruses that are able to insert their own genetic material into the genetic material of cells they
infect. When the inserted viral genes "turn on," they direct the host cell's own "intracellular machinery" to start
HNIAIDS Handbook 70-77
making more virus particles, which egress from the host and repeat the cycle.
(Total Learning Concepts, Inc., 3d ed. 1997).
" See Friedman-Kien & Mayer,
note 19, at 4.
14 See Thomas M. Folks & Clyde E. Hart, The Life Cvcle of Human Immunodeficiencv V i s T w e I. in AIDS:
~ t z o g yDiagnosis,
,
Treatment and Prevention,
note 19, at 29,29-30;
Jay A. Levy, Human

see

-

viruses ready and able to infect more cells.25This cyclical, exponential depletion of infectionfighting white blood cells leaves the infected individual susceptible to a variety of opportunistic
infectionsz6like pneumonia, herpes, and fungal

infection^.^'

Although sometimes used interchangeably, the terms HIV disease and AIDS are not
synonymous. Rather, HIV infection precedes and eventually leads to the development of AIDS.'~
A definitive diagnosis of AIDS requires the combination of confirmed HIV infection and either a
drop in the CD4 cell count below a certain critical level, or the development of one or more
"AIDS-associated illnesses.'y29HIV is transmitted through sexual contact, through blood or blood
products, or from mother to child during the perinatal period.30HIV cannot be transmitted from

lmmunodeficiencv Viruses and the Pathogenesis of AIDS, 261 JAMA 2997 (1989) (explaining how HIV infects
white blood cells).
" See HNtAIDS Handbook,
note 24, at 29-37.
note 22, at 69-77; Folks & Hart,
26 Opportunistic infections are caused by pathogens that almost everyone is exposed to, yet only cause severe and
note 22, at
persistent illnesses in individuals with compromised immune systems. See HIVIAIDS Handbook,
92. See aenerally Lowell S. Young, Omortunistic Infections in the Immunocom~romisedHost, in Basic & Clinical
lmmunology 706,706-09 (Daniel P. Stites et al. eds., 8th ed. 1994).
27 See Michael S. Saag, Clinical Spectrum of Human Immunodeficiencv Syndrome Virus Diseases. in AIDS:
Etiology, Diagnosis, Treatment and Prevention, anote 19, at 203,206-08.
It is incorrect, therefore, to say that one contracts AIDS. Rather, a person contracts HIV and may subsequently
Vance A. Fink, Jr., Comment, Emotional Distress Damages for Fear of Contractina AIDS:
develop AIDS.
Should Plaintiffs Have to Show Emosure to H N ? , 99 Dick. L. Rev. 779, 779 (1995) ("An individual will develop
AIDS only after being infected with [HIV]."); Ellen L. Luepke, Note, HIV Misdiagnosis: Nealiaent Infliction of
Emotional Distress and the False-Positive, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1229, 1229 n.5 (1996) (noting that HIV infection and
AIDS exist along a continuum); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M.133, 136-37,909 P.2d 14, 17-18
(Ct. App. 1995) (citing Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E. 2d 814,815 n.2 (1990)) (explaining how
the sequelae following initial HIV infection eventually leads to a diagnosis of "full blown" AIDS). SeeDemis
H. Osmond, Classifications and Staaine ofHIV Disease, in The AIDS Knowledge Base,
note 19, at 1.1-1,
1.1-4 (noting that the CDC defmition of AIDS requires confumation of HIV infection).
29
See HIVIAIDS Handbook. =a
note 22, at 85-92. While the presence of HIV is usually the minimum threshold
reqGement for a diagnosis of AIDS, an exception exists when HIV is undetectable and yet there exist certain
AIDS-associated illnesses accompanied by immunosuppression. &id. at 85. AIDS-associated illnesses include a
id. at 118, and several
variety of bacterial, fungal, and viral infections, see id. at 104, neoplastic diseases,
neurologic diseases, see id. at 128-3 1.
30
See Josephine Gittler & Sharon Rennert, HIV Infection Among Women and Children and Antidiscrimination
~
a An zOverview, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1313, 1316-17 (1992); Jonathan N. Weber & Robin A. Weiss, HIV Infection:
The Cellular Picture, Sci. Am., Oct. 1988, at 100, 100-09;
Gary G. Mathiason & Steven B. Berlin,
the Healthcare. Business, and Governmental Workplace, C780 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 633,637-38 (examples of sound
modes of transmission include use of contaminated needles, sexual intercourse with an HIV-infected individual,
contact with HIV-contaminated blood or blood products, and transmission from mother to child around the time of
birth); see generally Sten H. Vemund, Transmission of HIV-1 Among Adolescents and Adults, in AIDS: Etiology,
Diagnosis, Treatment and Prevention, -note
19, at 147, 147-55.

w,

-

-

-6-

one individual to another by mere casual ~ o n t a c t . Even
~ ' the risk of transmission through an
invasive contact. such as a needle-stick injury, is minimal.32After initial exposure, the presence
of the virus can be determined by tests that detect HIV antibodies or components of the virus
itse1f.3~However. it may take up to six months after initial infection before a patient tests HIVpositive?4 Furthermore, an individual infected with HIV can remain asymptomatic for several
years.35
The public concern over AIDS stems from the arcane nature of the disease, namely: (1)

HIV may go undetected in the blood for several months; (2) infected individuals may remain
asymptomatic for several years but still be infectious to others; (3) there exists no effective HIV
vaccine and no known cure; and (4) HIV infection eventually progresses to AIDS - a condition
that remains invariably

In this regard, AIDS is much like cancer in that both diseases are

latent, usually fatal conditions that develop at some indeterminable point in time after initial

-

exposure to a causative agent?' It is the furtive characteristics of AIDS, coupled with the

See Harold Jaffe, The Aovlication of Medical Facts to the Courts. in AlDS and the Courts,
note 18, at 7,
17-20; Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiencv Virus, 317 New Eng.
J. Med. 1125, 1132-33 (1987).
32
See Richard Denatale & s h a m D. Parrish, Health Care Workers' Abilih, to Recover in Tort for Transmission or
~ e r o ~ransmission
f
of HIV from a Patient, 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 751, 755-56 & 11.15(1996).
33 See HIVIALDS Handbook,
note 22, at 201-03.
34 There is a "window" of time between initial exposure to HIV and the production of detectable antibodies.
Ivan Yip, Note, Aidspbobia and the "Window of Anxietv": Enliehtened Reasoning or Concession to Irrational
Fear?
60 Brook. L. Rev. 461,470 (1994) (if there are no antibodies detectable by six months it is a "relative
+certainty" that the individual is HIV-negative);
Jaffe, m note 3 1, at 8-9 (although HIV may be
undetectable in the blood during the "window" period, the infected individual is still capable of transmitting the
virus). However, ninety-five percent of HIV-infected patients will test positive within six months of initial exposure
To the virus.
K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 n.5 (Minn. 1995). In addition, tests are now available that
can reliably determine the presence of HIV within four to six weeks of exposure.
Mandana Shahvari, Afraids:
Fear of AlDS as a Cause of Action, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 769,775 (1994). But Julia A. Metcalf et al., Acquired
Immunodeficiencv Svndrome: Seroloeic and Virologic Tests. in AIDS: Etiology, Diagnosis, Treatment and
note 19, at 177, 178 (noting that in uncommon cases it has taken up to three years to detect HIV
Prevention,
using blood tests).
35 See Jaffe, m note 3 1, at 1 1-12; Gerald Schochetman, Biolow of Human Immunodeficiencv Viruses. in AIDS
~ e x n g Methodology
:
and Management Issues 18,27 (Gerald Schochetman & J. Richard George eds., 1992)
(noting that HIV may remain in a latency period for up to ten years before symptoms emerge).
36
See Silverman,
note 18, at 31-32; Caitlin A. Schmid, Protecting the Physician in HIV Misdiagnosis Cases,
46Duke L.J. 431,431 (1996). It has been estimated that between 1981 and 1991, 100,000 people in the United
States died of AIDS. See id. at 43 1 & n.6.
37
See Fink, Jr., m note 28, at 779; Brian R. Garves, Fear of AIDS, 3 J. Pharmacy & L. 29,30 (1994). However,
unlike AIDS, cancer may develop due to a genetic predisposition not requiring exposure to a causative agent.

-

-
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sweeping ignorance regarding HIV transmission, that are mainly responsible for the genesis of
the "fear of AIDS" cases."
B.

The Evolution of NIED as a Cause ojilction

Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery where the defendant's
negligence caused only emotional harm.39Only when the mental disturbance has occurred in the
context of an intentional tort involving extreme and outrageous conduct4' calculated to cause
physical or emotional harm to the victim, have the courts been more willing to allow recovery 4 '
Under such circumstances, it has generally been required that the distress inflicted be of a
severity which no reasonable person could be expected to endure.42
Unlike situations involving intentional conduct, the courts have taken a more prudent
approach to recognizing compensation for emotional distress claims arising from mere negligent
c~nduct.~'
The circumspect attitude of the courts to this category of mental disturbance may be

-

ascribed to tenuous causal relations, the ability of claimants to easily feign or imagine emotional
Archibald S. Perkins & George F. Vande Woude, Principles of Molecular Cell Biologv of Cancer: Oncoeenes, in I
Cancer: Principles & Practice of Oncoloey 35.36 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. Eds., 4th ed. 1993).
38
See James C. ~ a r o u l i sNote,
,
Can HIV-fikeative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional ~ i s h e s Damages
s
for Their Fear
62 Fordham L. Rev. 225, 226-27 (1993).
39 See W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts $ 54, at 361 (5th ed. 1984);
~ e x t e m e n(Second)
t
of Torts $ 436A (1965) ("If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk
of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone,
the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."). From the beginning, some courts were concerned over the
potential increase in litigation because emotional dishess was difficult to quantify and recovery of damages relied on
conjecture and speculation. See Mitchell v. Rochester R.R. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 356 (N.Y.1896).
40
Exheme and outrageous conduct has been defmed as conduct "beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as ahocious, and utterly intolerable as a civilized community."
Restatement (Second) of Torts fj 46
m t . d (1965).
41 Under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress or I.I.E.D.
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 46
cmt. a (1965); Keeton, anote 39, $ 12, at 60. New Mexico first recognized the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, referred to initially as the "law of outrage," in Mantz v. Follinestad, 84 N.M. 473, 479-80, 505
P.2d 68,74-75 (Ct. App. l972), and subsequently reaffirmed and refined the general principle in a series of
decisions. %Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 881 P.2d 1376 (1994); Sanders v.
Lutz, 109 N.M. 193,784 P.2d 12 (1989); Ramirez v. Armshong, 100 N.M. 538,673 P.2d 822 (1983): Andrews v.
Stallings, 119N.M. 478, 892 P.2d 61 1 (Ct. App. 1995); Stieber v. Journal Publ'g Co., 120 N.M. 270, 901 P.2d 201
(Ct. App. 1995); Phifer v. Herbert, 115 N.M. 135, 848 P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1993); Rummel v. Edgemont Realty
Partners, Ltd., 116 N.M. 23, 859 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1993); Hakkila v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 812 P.2d 1320 (Ct.
App. 1991); Tmjillo v. Puro, 101 N.M 408, 683 P.2d 963 (Ct. App. 1984); Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 21 1,638
P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981).
41
See Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 46 cmt. j (1965); Domineuez, 97 N.M. at 215,638 P.2d at 427. The New
Mexico Supreme Court announced in Ramirez v. Armstrong that the same standard would henceforth apply to
unintentional, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 n.1.

ofAids?,

-_

injury, concerns over the potential for spurious and vexatious litigation, and hesitancy to punish

-

negligent conduct.44Therefore, in addition to satisfying the traditional elements of negligence,45
the courts have generally required proof of more objective criteria in order to guarantee or certify
that a mental disturbance is, in fact, genuine.46Over the years, the courts have developed several
"screening devices" to achieve this
The "Physical Injury, " "Physical Impact, " "Physical Manifestation, " and
"Zone o f Danger " Doctrines

1.

While "[tlhere exists in New Mexico no recognized cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress except for bystander liability"4%ew Mexico has accepted the
traditional rule that where a defendant causes an actual physical injury to the plaintiff, he is liable
not only for the physical consequences of his tortious impact but also for the emotional distress
or mental suffering resulting from it.49Such emotional distress damages have been traditionally
referred to as "parasitic" to the "host" claim of damages-they

are dependent upon and attach to

the physical injury.50Under the physical injury rule, plaintiffs could not sue under a separate tort
cause of action labeled NIED." Instead, recovely was limited to emotional distress that occurred

43
44-

See Keeton,

note 39, 5 54, at 360.

see

See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d
-

171, 178-79 (Mass. 1982);
Keeton,
note 39, $54, at 361
("The temporary emotion of fright . . is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so trivial, that the
courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against mere negligence . . .").
OS Namely: duty, breach, causation in fact, proximate causation and injury.
Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618,625
(Tern. 1997); Victoria L. Rees, AIDSPhobia: Forcing Courts to Face New Areas of Com~ensationfor Fear of a
Deadlv Disease, 39 Vill. L.Rev. 241,245-46 (1994); Harris 1. Zakarin, Scared to Death: A Cause of Action for
AIDS Phobia, 10 Touro L. Rev. 263,267 (1993).
46
See Keeton, -note
39, $54, at 362.
47 See Rees,
note 45, at 268.
48 Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306,310,871 P.2d 962,966 (1994). There exists in New Mexico no drafted jury
instruction for non-bystander NIED.
N.M.R.A. Civ. U.J.I. 13-1630 committee comment (1997) ("New Mexico
law is not sufficiently developed in this area to permit the drafting of a uniform jury instruction."). In this regard,
New Mexico has followed other jurisdictions in refusing to allow recovery for purely psychic injury, recognizing
that emotional distress is usually a temporary affliction that is difficult to quantify and relatively easy to feign. See
Keeton,
note 39, $ 54, at 361-63; Restatement (Second) of Torts $ 436A cmt. b (1965).
49 See Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,471,797 P.2d 246,260 (1990) (citing Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278,280
(Ohio 1987));
Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446,451-52,63 1 P.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Ct. App. 1981) (allowing
recovery for mental pain and suffering as a consequence of physical injuries); Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379, 38 1,
552 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 1976) (same). Scholarly writers have long accepted the same. See Keeton, anote
3 9 , s 54, at 362-63; Restatement (Second) of Torts 436 (1965).
50
See Restatement (Second) of Tom 8 436A (1965).
Mary Donovan, Is the IniurvReauirement Obsolete in a Claim for Fear of Future Conseauences?, 41 UCLA
L . ~ v 1337,
.
1348-49 (1994).
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contemporaneously with inflicted injuries.52Eventually the courts expanded the "physical
injury" concept, permitting recovery under an independent tort of NIED provided there was
some proof of "physical impact."" The impact rule, which limits recovery to plaintiffs who
could prove that the defendant's negligent conduct caused a "physical impact" or "physical
h-"34

to the plaintiffs person, became universally recognized by the courts.s5Presumably due

to arbitrariness, however, the courts progressively stretched the boundaries of the term "impact,"
allowing recovery for mental distress flowing from innocuous c ~ n t a c t . ' ~

The terms "physical injury" and "physical impact" are at times treated as synonyms and
at other times, as antonyms. For example, some commentators and jurisdictions have
distinguished a "physic,al impact" from a "physical injury,"57 treating the two as distinct and
separate

occurrence^?^ Other jurisdictions have linked the concepts, requiring that a discernible

physical injury result from an initial physical impact.59Still others have treated the terms as

In addition, rather than just recognizing emotional distress resulting from a physical
insult, courts permitted recovery for those who could show some subsequent "physical
52 See Payton
53 -

v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171,176 (Mass. 1982).

See id. The "impact" rule had its origins in Britain in the nineteenth century. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 Eng. Rep.
--

557 (H.L. 1861); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P C. 1888) (appeal taken from Vict.).
Although the rule was subsequently overturned in Britain a short time later, see Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669
(1901), by then it had already been adopted by the American courts, see Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 45 N.E. 354
(N.Y. 1896)
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897). See Archibald H. Throckmorton,
Damages for Fright, 34 Haw. L. Rev. 260,264-65 (1921) (discussing the adoption of the rule in several other U.S.
jurisdictions).
54
The extent of the physical harm required under the rule varies. See,,Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72
(3d Clr. 1978) (fmding that dormant bacterial infection satisfies requirement); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
639 S.W.2d 431 ( T ~ M .1982) (finding that ingestion of contaminated water satisfied requirement despite absence of
physical symptomology). SeeVance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728,734 (Md. 1979) (stating that aphysical harm
must be verifiable by "objective determination").
55
See Keeton, -note
39, § 54, at 363.
56 -id.- at 363-64 & nn.43-53.
"See,
Robert C. Bollinger, On the Road to Recovery for EmotionalHarm: Is the Fear of AIDS a Legally
Compensable I n- i ~w ? , 16 J. Legal Med. 417,424 (1995).
58
Wetherill v. ~niveriicyof chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. 111. 1983).
59
R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360,362 (Fla. 1995); Etienne v. Caputi, 679 N.E.2d 922,925
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452,454 (Ind. 1991)). SeeFink,
note
28, at 78 1 (discussing the requirement of an accompanying physical injury resulting from an initial impact).
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manifestation"attributab1e to their emotional di~tress.~'
Eventually, a handful of courts

.--.

altogether abandoned the requirement of ~hysicalharm and recogn~zedan independent cause of
action for NIED.~'However, many of these same courts subsequently retreated from this
position, eschewing NIED as an independent cause of action and narrowing the circumstances
under which the absence of physical harm would still permit recovery.63
In lieu of the physical impact mle, some jurisdictions employ a "zone of dangeP test,
which depends upon the proximity of the plaintiff to the risk of harm created by the defendant's
negligent conduct.64In this context, "zone of danger" refers to those persons who are subjected
to the risk of physical harm from the defendant's conduct and who fear for their own sarety,6' as
opposed to thosepersons within the range of potential risk but whose emotional distress results
from witnessing the harm to another (bystander-liability).66However, in most jurisdictions,
recovery for bystander-liability is no longer limited by the plaintiffs presence within the "zone

p~

See. ex., Marchica v. Long Island RR, 3 1 F.3d 1197, 1202 (2d Cir. 1994); Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,470-71,
797 P.2d 246,259-60 (1990).
See Restatement (Second) of Torts $8 436,436A (1965); Marchica.31 F.3d at 1203.
62 See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps,, 616 P.2d 813,8 14 (Cal. 1980); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509,520 (Haw.
1970); Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765,772 (Mo. 1983); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649,650
(Tex. 1987). As a limiting device, most courts required thatthe mental disturbance be objectively serious.
R o d r i ~ u 472
e ~ P.2d at 520 ("[Slerious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted,
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress . . . .").
"See Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possible?, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 13
Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278,281-82 (Cal. 1989) (limiting
(1992);
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980)). While physical harm was no longernecessary, other
circumstances were required to establish the breach of a duty owed. In the absence of physical injury, recovery
would be permitted if the mental disturbance "result[ed] from the breach of a duty owed the plaintiff that is assumed
by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the
two." Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282 (emphasis added);
Boyles v. Ken, 855 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1993)
(establishing that a duty may arise kom a statute, the common law, or from the actions of the parties). For example,
recovery of damages for pure emotional distress, absent physical impact or manifestation, has been allowed in the
context of physician-patient relationships, see Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282 n.5, and where a contractual duty exists,
w,Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306,31 I, 871 P.2d 962,966 (1994) (mental distress arising from the breach of a
funeral contract),
Chavez v. Manville Prods. Carp., 108 N.M. 643,777 P.2d 371 (1989) (emotional distress
resulting from retaliatory discharge in breach of an employment contract). SeeKaren L. Chadwick, m
f
AIDS: The Catalyst for Expanding Judicial Recognition of a Dutv to Prevent Emotional Distress Bevond Traditional
&g&,
25 N.M. L. Rev. 143, 149-52 (1995) (noting that "direct" liability doesn't require physical harm or
bystander status provided that a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant establishes a duty to
grevent emotional harm).
See Marchica, 3 1 F.3d at 1203.
65 See Sarah W. Thompson, Note, Actual Physical Peril: The New Element to Ohio's Prima Facie Case For
~ e z e e n c e ?25
, Cap. U. L. Rev. 993,995 (1996).
66 See Restatement (Second) of Torts 5s 3 13(2), 436(3) (1965).
6o
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of danger."67 While the development of the "zone of danger" rule seemingly ameliorated h e
harshness of the impact rule, several courts still required that emotional distress be demonstrated
by some physical rnanife~tation.~~
In New Mexico, the term "zone of danger" has different meanings depending upon the
context in which it is used by the courts. For example, in the case of bystander-liability, New
Mexico does not require that a plaintiff be within the "zone of danger" in order to recover for
emotional distress from witnessing the peril or harm to another.69In thls setting, the phrase
While rejected a s a
describes those "persons having some physical proximity to the tortfea~or."'~
rule for bystander recovery, the term is, nohetheless, used by the New Mexico courts as a general
test of foreseeability: "a description of the class of persons that a reasonable person would
conclude based on the circumstances was subject to a risk by the defendant's acts or
omissions.""
-

Outside of bystander-liability, most courts continue to apply the physical injury, physical
impact and the physical manifestation rules - alone or in combination - to NIED claims. Such
limiting devices satisfy the need for an objective check on the legitimacy of emotional injuries,
providing a guarantee of genuineness.72However, the desire of the courts to preserve authentic

67

See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Mass. 1982) (and cases cited therein).

u,
Williams v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 403,406 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Williams v. Baker, 572

68-

A.2d 1062, 1070 (D.C. 1990) (and cases cited therein); Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867,875 (Minn.
1986).
69
See Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538,542,673 P.2d 822,826 (1983) (adopting the rule established in Dillon
&, 441 P.2d 912,920-21(Cal. 1968), with the additional requirement thatthe plaintiff show some phys~cal
manifestation of his or her emotional distress). Ramirez was subsequently modified by Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,
471,797 P.2d 246,260 (1 990) (abolishing requirement of subsequent physical manifestation of emotional trauma).
70
See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,274,923 P.2d 1154, 1159 (1996).
7' E(explaining how the phrase "zone of danger" was used in Cakins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 61.792 P.2d
36,38 (1990)).
72 See Keeton,
note 39, 154, at 361. In addition to providing indicia of genuineness, the physical
injury/impact~manifestationrules are primarily used to establish duty and causation. See, ex., PaGon, 437 N.E.2d at
180 ("[E]motional distress is reasonably foreseeable when there is a causal relationship between the physical injuries
suffered and the emotional distress alleged."). In the bystander-liability context, however, the injury;impact and
physical manifestation rules have almost universally been abandoned.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Buell, 480 U.S. 557,570 11.20(1987); see also Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157 (explaining the holding
from &, 1 10 N.M. at 471, 797 P.2d at 260, that a bystander need not suffer an initial physical impact nor a
subsequent physical manifestation to recover damages for emotional dismss).

claims for emotional distress at the expense of invalid ones has resulted in "inconsistency and

-

incoherence" in the application of these rules.73

2.

"Fear ofFurure Dlsease" Doctrine

Because AIDS only became a recognized disease in 1981:~ recovery of NIED damages
for fear of developing AIDS remains a novel remedy, providing fertile ground for debate.
Consequently, most courts have relied upon the rationale and analysis from the "fear of future
di~ease"'~cases for guidance.76For nearly a century, recovery for emotional distress arising from
a fear of contracting a disease in the future has been recognized where the defendant's

negligence gave rise to the fear.77The majority of early cases "involved fears that were
necessarily short-lived."" It wasn't until the rise in toxic tort litigation79that actions for more
latent conditions such as "fear of cancer"80became more commonplace

,-

73

Cases analyzing fear

See Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437,440 (Tern. 1996). The frustration in discerning and applying the various
r u K w a s perhaps best expressed in Hunslev v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Wash. 1976), wheren the court stated:
"Any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed perplexity."
74 See Marsha F. Goldsmith, "Critical Moment" at Hand in HIVIAIDS Pandemic. New Global S h a t e ~ v
to Arrest its
~ m y Prowsed,
d
268 JAMA 445 (1992).
'7 For an overview of American tort law regarding emotional distress as an element of recoverv in future disease. see
generally David Carl Minneman, Annotation, ~ u 6 r Disease
e
or Condition, or AnxieN ela at ink Thereto, as ~ l e m e n t
of Recovew, 50 A.L.R. 4th 13 (1986).
76
See Edward M. Slaughter, AIDS phobia: The Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fear ofAIDS, 16 U. Haw.
~ . i i i v 143,
.
154 (1995).
n &&&, Jones v. United R.Rs., 202 P. 919,922-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921) (fear of future disability): Figlar v.
Gordon, 53 A.2d 645,648 (Conn. 1947) (fear of developing epilepsy); Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E.
152, 153 (Ga. 1905) (fear of dying from glass In the stomach); Butts v. National Exch. Bank, 72 S.W. 1083, 1084
(Mo. Ct. App. 1903) (fear of blood poisoning); Walker v. Boston & Maine R.R., 51 A. 918,919 W.H. 1902) (fear of
going insane); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885,886 (N.C. 1912) (fear of developing cancer from
severe bums); Ward Baking Co. v. Triuino, 161 N.E. 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928) (fear from swallowing needles);
Southern Kan. Ry. v. McSwain, 118 S.W. 874, 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (fear of blood poisoning); Elliott v.
Arrowsmith, 272 P. 32,32-33 (Wash. 1928) (fear ofhaving a miscarriage). As a general rule, the early courts held
that one who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, which another contracts, is liable in
damages, provided the feared disease actually develops.
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334,340 (Wyo. 1979) (and
cases cited therein): 39 Am. Jur. 26 -"
Health 6 48 (I 9681.
78 Terry ~ o r e h e a d ~ w o r k iFear
n , of Disease and ~ e l i y e Manifestation
d
Iniuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?,
53 Fordham L. Rev. 527.542 & n.121 (1984).
79 For an historical overview ofthe emerioncdof mxic tort litigation, see generally Arvin Maskin, et al., Overview
and U ~ d a t eof Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Litigation, C837 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 629 (1993).
80
Fear of cancer cases began to appear in the middle ofthis century. See,,Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918
(E.D. Pa. 1951) (fear of developing breast cancer); Flood v. Smith, 13 A.2d 677 (Corn. 1940) (same); Kimbell v.
Noel, 228 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950, writ refd n.r.e.) (same). Some courts and commentators have referred
to the anxiety of developing cancer as "cancerphobia."
Gale & Goyer,
note 5, at 724-25. The term
"cancerphobia" was first used to describe a person's fear of developing cancer in Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d
249,251 (N.Y.
1958). However, "cancerphobia" and "fear of cancer" are distinct. The former refers to a phobic

of developing cancer have usually involved exposure to asbestos fibers,82diethylstilbestrol
A

(DES),~'and other potential carcinogens or chemical toxins.84Before permitting compensation
for fear of developing a disease at some point in the future, the courts have required that one or
more of the traditional tests for NIED be satisfied8'- such as proof of a discernible physical
86

injury, or proof of physical impact or physically invasive contact,'' and objective proof of
reasonable fear.88For the courts, fulfillment of these criteria provided objective proof of "actual

reaction in the absence of objective evidence, while the latter refers to an anxiety caused by the fear of developing
cancer, but is not a mental illness.
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 805 n.5 (Cal. 1993).
See Glen Donath, Comment, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness Redefmed, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113,
I1 13 (1995). Traditionally, fear of cancer was analyzed by the courts as a subset of "nosophobia, the general fear of
id.
diseases."
See. e.a,Herber v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 785 F2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985); Jackson v, lohns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985); Durn
Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563
v. Owens-Coming Fibergalss, 774 F. Supp. 929 (D.V.I. 1991);
(D. Haw. 1990);
Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634 (D. Me. 1986); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480
A.2d 647 (Del. 1984); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mauro v.
Raymark Indus., lnc., 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1985). Inhalation of ashestos fibers may lead to a variety of pulmonary disorders, including asbestosis and
lung cancer.
Potts v. Celotex Cop., 796 S.W.2d 678,679 & n.2 (Tenn. 1990). See generally Barry I.
Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects I (4th ed. 1996): Nancy Campbell Brown, Note, Predicting the
Future: Present Mental Anguish for Fear of Develo~ingCancer in the Future as a Result of Past Asbestos Ex~osure,
23 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 337 (1993).
83
See McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. 111. 1986); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F.
S U I1553 (N.D. 111. 1983); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. 111. 1978); Plummer v. Abbon
Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920 @.R.I. 1983); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1981). DES was an
experimental drug widely administered to pregnant woman because it purportedly reduced the risk of miscarriages.
S e e m 437 N.E.Zd at 172. DES has been identified as a causative agent in the development of cancer of the
reproductive organs in daughters of the women who took DES. &id.
81
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F.
Supp. 1219 @. Mass. 1986); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990); Potter v. Firestone T i e &
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982); Ayers v.
Township of Jackson, 461 A.2d 184 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); (all involving fear of developing cancer from
exposure to chemically contaminated drinking water); Anderson v. Welding Testing lab., Inc., 304 So. 2d 351 (La.
1974) (fear of ~ost-irradiationcancer): Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (same).
"see ~ o n e r863
, P.2d at 805. See generally Scott D.Marrs, Mind Over ~ o d ; :'l'rends ~ecardin; the Phvsical lniury
Requirement in Neeliaent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of D~sease"Cases, 28 Tort & Ins. L.J. I
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Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 179 A.2d 401,410-14 (N.J. 1962) (fear of cancer resulting from chemical
bum injury).
The physical impact requirement is usually satisfied by objective evidence of exposure to the disease-causing
agent, irrespective of resulting symptomology. See,,Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3rd Cir. 1978)
(infectious bacteria entering the body); &&, 460 F. Supp. 713 (ingestion of DES); M,639 S.W.Zd 431
761 F.2d 1129 (mbalat~onof asbestos fibers), But see Potter,
(ingestion of contaminated drinking water);
863 P.2d at 81 1 (holding that a toxic ingest~onor exposure, without more, does not provide an actionable claim for
fear of developing a future illness).
88
See Farrall v. A.C. & S. Co., 558 A.2d 1078 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). For an in-depth overview of the parameters
utilized by courts to assess the objective reasonableness ofmental anguish see, Dworkin,
note 76, at 561-63.
In the asbestos exposure cases, the courts have allowed plaintiffs to demonstrate the reasonableness oftheir fears by
permitting expert medical testimony as to the probability of developing cancer and the requirement for medical
surveillance.
Devlin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 495 A.2d 495,499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).

m,

--

exposure" to a disease-causing entity, a general prerequ~siteto re~overy.'~
The policy underlying
the "proof of exposure" requirement is that no reasonable person would feat contracting a future
disease without some medically objective evidence of actual exposure to a disease-causing
agent.90
Consequently, "fear of hture disease" cases provide instructive precedent concerning the
In its reasoning, however, the Madrid
causal links between exposure, injury, and rec~very.~'
court largely ignored this panoply of "fear of future disease" precedent. Instead, the court opted
for basic tort doctrine analysis, and declined to accept the reasoning developed and adopted by
the majority of other jurisdictions.
IV. RATIONALE

A.

-

Madrid Adopts the "Impact" Rule and Rejects the Majoriiy "ActualExposure"
Test

The Madrid decision permits recovery on a cause of action for emotional distress based
upon a negligently created fear of developing AIDS without requiring threshold proof of actual
exposure to HIV, provided a medically sound channel of transmission exists?' Inother words, it
is irrelevant whether the alleged conduit of HIV-bloody

89

fluids in the Madrid case-actually

Most case law has required that a plaintiff not only demonstrate a physical injury, but also actual exposure.

a,
Harper v. lllinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no recovery for emotional
distress absent evidence of exposure to disease-causing agent). SeeFink, Jr.,
note 28, at 785 ("[Tlhe

,~--.

injury requirement often means 'exposure' to a disease-causing agent."); Rees,
note 45, at 264 ("All plaintiffs
alleging emotional distress due to the fear of contracting a future disease must prove exposure to a disease-causing
agent before allegations of emotional distress will be considered even remotely compensable.").
90
See. ex., In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567-70 @. Haw. 1990) (noting that exposure
provides objective evidence of connection between physical harm and emotional distress). Without such limiting
devices, the "task of discerning fraudulent 'fear o f [disease] claims from meritorious ones would be 'prodigious."'
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Ayers v. Jackson, 461
A.2d 184, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983)). m N e s o m v. Tri Hawk Int'l, 985 F.2d 208,210 (5th Cir.
1993) (requiring proof of exposure only in the absence of physical injury or contact).
see,,
Games,
note 37, at 30 (noting that the similarity between AIDS and cancer has resulted in courts
analyzing such cases with similar standards); John Patrick Darby, Tort Liabilitv for the Transmission ofthe AIDS
Virus: Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prosvective AIDS, 45 Wash. I Lee L. Rev. 185, 188 (1988) ("Because of
similarities between HIV and carcinogens, courts analyzing liability for transmitting HIV should examine a
defendant's liability under established law for exposing a plaintiff to a carcinogen."). SeeNeal v. Neal, 873 P.2d
881, 887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("The similarities between terminal cancer and A I D S t h e i r latent manifestation
and their deadly, incurable nature-have led courts and commentators to analyze actions for fear of contracting
AIDS under the same standards as actions for fear of developing cancer.")
92
See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,278, 923 P.2d 1154, 1163 (1996).

-

-

contains HIV, or is otherwise HIV-infected. According to

w,ir cannot be concluded "as a

matter of law that at the time a person is negligently exposed to a disease-transmitting agent
(blood) through a medically sound channel of transmission (open wounds) a fear of contracting
AIDS is irrationa~."~~
In its reasoning, the Madrid court relied on traditional tort principles that were formulated
well before the advent of unique diseases like A I D S . ~Specifically,
~
the court determined that the
plaintiff was entitled to recovery because she suffered a "physical impact" as a result of the
Medical Center's negligent conduct?' Recruiting the opinion from Folz v. State, the Madrid
court reasoned that "emotional . . . injuries which have arisen as a proximate result96of the
defendant[s'] tortious act are compensable under the traditional rule for recovery. The tortfeasor
takes his victim as he finds him, the effect of his tortious act upon the person being the measure
of damages."97Applying this traditional rubric, the court concluded that limiting recovery by

7.

requiring threshold proof of "actual exposure" is unnecessary because "[ilt is the invasive
'impact' of the bloody fluid that gives rise to Madrid's claim for damages under the general rule
that emotional injuries suffered by the victim of tortious impact are reco~erable."~~
The Madrid court refused to impose the majority "actual exposure" rule as a limiting
device.'' It cautioned that such a rule would require plaintiffs to prove both that the conduit of
disease transmission carried HIV, and that a medically sound channel of transmission existed.Io0
Instead, the court held that once "impact" with the alleged conduit of disease transmission was
See id. at 276,923 P.2d at 1161.
For example, the impact rule made its debut in the late nineteenth century, see.,
Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R.
Co., 47 N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897), nearly one hundred years before the first case of AIDS was diagnosed.
95 See Madrid. 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157. For this reason the court found it unnecessary to analyze N E D
cases not involving a physical impact.
id.
96
In its opmion, the M
a Court does not directly address whether the impact with bloody fluid satisfies causation.
The Court intimates, however, that the impact makes the emotional injury a foreseeable consequence. See id. at 274,
923 P.2d at 1154.
97
See id. at 272 (quoting Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,471, 797 P.2d246,260 (1990)).
9s -See id. (citing Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197,1204 (2d Cir. 1994)). The Marchica court held that
where a plaintiff "suffer[~]an actual physical injury. . . the rule governing fear of future disease is inapposite and
the traditional negligent infliction of emotional distress analysis applies." 31 F 3d at 1204.
99
See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157.
-93
94--
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shown, only proof that a medically sound channel of transmission existed would be required.'''

-

In Madrid, blood coming into contact with unhealed paper cuts on the plaintiffs hands was cited
as the viable channel of transrnissi~n.''~
For the court, a rule requiring proof of amedically
sound channel of transmission, regardless of the presence of HIV, sufficiently limits potential
liability yet permits the adjudication of genuine claims.lo3In support of its reasoning, the court
quoted from the opinion in Williamson v. Waldman:104
[Wlhere a defendant's negligent act or omission provides an
occasion from which a reasonable apprehension of contracting a
deadly disease may eventuate, and where the aualitv of the conduct
is such to crcate a ~ s u m ~ t i of
o nexvosure, the resulting claim for
damages by reason of emotic~nalinjury may not be dismissed . . .
10s

Implicit in the Madrid court's holding is that claims for emotional distress arising from a
fear of possibly developing AIDS are to be limited to the time period between the alleged
..

exposure incident, and the receipt of conclusive test results demonstrating that the plaintiff is

negative."^ This so-called "window of anxiety" rule originated in those few jurisdictions
that, like Madrid, rejected the "actual exposure" test.'''

The "window of anxiety" was defined by

the Madrid court as a period of up to six months because "[ulnder the current state of medical
knowledge, the absence of actual HIV infection will be known within six months after an

'"See id, at 275,923 P.2d at 1 160.
=id. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.
102-& at270,923 P.2d at 1155.
& Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ch., 121 N.M. 133, 141,909 P.2d 14,
22 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts, if proven, to demonstrate that the exposure incident
includes a medically sound method of transmission through the unhealed paper cuts on her hands . . . .). The Madrid
court also made it clear that where no medically sound channel of hansmission exists, no claim for emotional
dishess will lie. See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 272,923 P.2d at 1162.
Irn
See id. a t 275, 923 P.2d at 1160.
6 T I x 2 d 1179, 1180-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. AOP. Div. 1996).
105
See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 274,92j P.2d at i i 5 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Williamson, 677 A.2d at 1180-81)
-I N See id. at 277,923 P.2d at 1 162
107
See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993); Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1997); DeMilio v.
~chrager,666 A.2d 627 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995); Tischlerv. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1994). However, several
jurisdictions that have adopted the "actual exposure" test have also incorporated the "window of anxiety" rule.
Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d 253,256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648
N.Y.S.2d 880,887 (App. Div. 1996); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Sews., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594
(Tenn. 1993). See generally Yip, -note
34.
lo'

--

--

exposure incident."lo8 The rationale beh~ndthe six-month time limit is that "emotional-distress

-

damages must be based upon fears experienced by a reasonable and well-informed person."'0g
Accordingly, after the "window of anxiety" has passed, reasonable and well-informed persons
should no longer experience continuing emotional distress because they know or should know
that they are not HIV-infected.'" Any persisting fear would be unreasonable in that it would no
longer be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.'"
Finally, in addition to the rules it articulated specifically addressing the possible exposure
to HIV, the Court noted that recovery of en~otionaldistress damages for fear of developing AIDS
would still require proof of all the traditional elements of a negligence cause of action.'I2
Therefore, under the Madrid decision recovery of damages in aNIED claim for fear of
developing AIDS requires proof of: (1) a physical impact (exposure incident) between the
possible disease-transmitting agent and the plaintiff, (2) a medically sound channel of
transmission existing contemporaneously with the exposure incident, (3) awareness by the
plaintiff that the exposure incident created a possibility of contracting a deadly disease, (4)
enduring ignorance on the part of the plaintiff as to whether or not he or she was actually
exposed to a deadly disease, (5) emotional distress arising during the "window of anxiety," and

(6) all the elements of a traditional claim for negligence.'I3 In short, "[olnly those persons whose
conduct departs from the standard of reasonable care and results in an exposure through a
medically sound channeI of transmission will be held liable."'14
B.

Rejecting the ''Actual Exposure" Test Advances the Policy ofDeferring
Unreasonable Conducf

I" B,
122 N.M. at 277,923 P 2d at 1162. SeeMadrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133,137,
909 P.2d 14, 18 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Ninety-five percent of HIV-infected individuals will test HIV positive within six
months of the date of exposure.")
log See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 23.
'''See id.; Madrid, 121 N.M. a t 142,909 P.2d at 23.
"I gad rid,^ N.M. at 142, 909 P.2d at 23.
'IZ
Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162
113-The required elements were derived by combining the supreme court's conclusion, seeid. at 278,923 P.2d at
1163, with the holding from the court of appeals, see Madrid. 121 N.M. at 143,909 P.2d at 24.
'I4 See Madr~d,122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.

See

In its opinion, the Madrid court addressed a number of concerns that have been raised as

-

,justificationfor adoption of the majority actual exposure test.' ' j Posited concerns have included
the possibility of increased liability and medical malpractice insurance premiums, excessive
litigation premised on irrational fears, decreased compensation for those victims who actually
contract HIV and subsequently develop AIDS, and the creation of an unworkable rule that leads
In addressing these policy concerns, the
to inconsistent results and discourages settlen~ents."~

Madrid court distinguished its reasoning from that formulated in the "fear of cancer" cases
wherein many of the same considerations were involved.
First, the Madrid court evaluated the reasoning from Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
&'I7

In

w,the California Supreme Court considered whether emotional distress arising

from a fear of developing cancer in the future as a result of exposure to carcinogens permits

-

recovery of damages in anegligence action."' The plaintiffs in Potter discovered that
carcinogenic chemicals had contaminated their domestic water wells as a result of the
defendant's negligent operation of a nearby toxic waste site.'I9 The plaintiffs were subsequently
exposed to carcinogens via their ingestion of the contaminated water supply.'20While not
addressing whether the ingestion of carcinogens qualified as a "physical impact," the m

r court

noted that it lacked a factual basis to decide whether the ingestion had resulted in a physical
injury to which parasitic damages for emotional distress could attach.I2' Regardless, the m

r

court, relying on its former decisions, eschewed the physical injury requirement as a "hopelessly
imprecise screening device."'2z Instead, the court focused on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs

'I5
See id. at 275, 923
... --

"'See id.

-

'I7
'I8

P.2d at 1162

863E

d 795 (Cal. 1993).
-See id. at 805.'

at 801-02.
See id. at 808.
12, -See id. at 807. Other courts have found that exposure to toxins resulting in immune system impairment or
-subcellular damage qualifies as a physical injury. See id. at 806 (and cases cited therein).
12* -See id. at 810.
' I 9 See id.
120 --

fear in developing cancer in the future due to a toxic exposure.12' The court concluded that in the
absence of physical injury or illness, recovery of damages for fear of cancer should only be
allowed if the plaintiff can demonstrate that it is medically "more likely than not" that cancer
will develop in the future due to the toxic exposure.'24The court reasoned that a carcinogenic
ingestion or exposure, without more, does not provide a reasonable basis for fearing future
disease attributable to the exposure.'25 From a policy standpoint, the m

r court was concerned

about unreasonable claims based upon speculative fears and the magnitude of the potential class
of plaintiffs because "all of us are exposed to carcinogens every day" and, therefore, "[a]U of us
are potential fear of ~ancer~laintiffs."'~~
The "more likely than not" standard from

was subsequently applied in a "fear of

AIDS" case by the California Court of Appeals in Kerins v. ~art1ey.I~'
In

w,the plaintiff

brought a cause of action for NIED after learning that her physician, who had performed an

-

invasive surgical operation on her, was HIV-infected.'28Following the direction given by the
California Supreme Court in W r , the Kerins court held that:
[I]n the absence of physical injury or illness, damages for fear of
AIDS may be recovered only if the plaintiff is exoosed to HIV or
AIDS as a result of the defendant's negligent breach of a duty
owed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiffs fear stems from a
knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion,
that it is more likely than not he or she will become HIV
seropositive and develop AIDS due to the exposure."'29

123

I"
,A,

-

See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795,810 (Cal. 1993).

See id. at 800.
See id. at 811.
See id.at 8 1 1-12. The Madrid court excerpted the same quotes from Potter in its opinion.
--

Madrid v. Lincoln
Countv Med. Ctr.. 122 N.M. 269.275.923 P2d 1154. 1160 (1996).
33 kal. Rptr. 2d 172 (1994). TWO additional ~alifdmiacases have also applied the Potter standard in the "fearof
AIDS" context.
Macy's Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (1995): Herbert v. Regenls ofUniv. of
Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709 (1994).
I2'See Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174-75.
I29
Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
-

'*'

The Kerins Court concluded that the plaintiffs likelihood of developing AIDS was a

-

"most speculative possibility"'30 and, therefore, any fear of developing AIDS in the future was,
as a matter of law, unreasonable.I3' In support of its decision, the Kerins court echoed the same
policy concerns expressed in the Potter decision-namely,

effects on the cost and availability of

malpractice insurance, excessive litigation, and the adequacy of compensation for those who
actually develop AIDS as a result of negligent c ~ n d u c t . " ~
Without much elaboration, the Madrid court distinguished its reasoning from that in

-,

noting that while it is true that each of us are exposed to carcinogens every day, not all of

us are exposed to HIV everyday.133And while there exists much less medical certainty when and
if one will develop cancer after exposure to a carcinogen,134HIV infection-and,

therefore, one's

propensity to develop A 1 D k a n be ruled out within six months of the initial exposure
incident.I3' Therefore, unlike the indefinite period of time involved in toxic exposure cases, the

-

time period during which emotional distress may arise after a possible HIV exposure incident is
confined to six months.'j6 By implication then, concerns over the magnitude of the class of
potential plaintiffs and the resultant flood of litigation are not the same in the "fear of AIDS"
context as they are in the "fear of cancer" context.13'
The Madrid court also distinguished its opinion from the Kerins decision. The court noted
that under its rule, it too would have dismissed the plaintiffs claim in Kerins because in that
case, unlike Madrid, no medically sound channel of transmission was present.'38 In-,

the

absence of HIV exposure through a medically sound channel of transmission, in part, made the
Id.
-

"' See id. at 180.

See id. at 178-79 (also referred to in m,122 N.M. at 276,923 P.2d at 1161)
--

132--

See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.
See potter-v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 81 1 (Cal. 1993).
135
Madrid, 122 N.M. at 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
'33

134

See
See id.
'"'X--

plaintiffs fears unreasonable under the "more likely than not" standard.'39o n the contrary, for
A

the Madrid court. one's fear of developing AIDS after an exposure incident involving contact
with blood and unhealed wounds was not irrati0na1.l~~
Therefore, the &&&id court adjudged the
policy concerns expressed in

and subsequently adopted in

w,as less compelling in

the fear of AIDS context, especially when a medically sound channel of transmission exists.I4'
As a result, the court found it unnecessary to employ the "actual exposure" test as a limiting
device because it agreed with the argument that "with the channel of transmission test . . . there
is little likelihood of disaster in the recognition of a cause of action for genuine cases of
emotional distress."'42
The primary policy objective advanced by the court's niling was the deterrence of
unreasonable conduct.'43The court felt that given "the deadly nature of the AIDS virus,
reasonable care should be encouraged . . . in the handling of potential disease-transmitting agents

-

such as blood."'44 The court reasoned that imposing potential liability upon those whose conduct
may create a risk of exposure to innocent persons would encourage reasonable care and deter
others from engaging in unreasonable conduct.145The court concluded that to the extent this
deterrence scheme reduces exposure incidents, "recognition of a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress serves the laudable goal of promoting public health.'"46 Insofar as
concerns over the impact of its ruling upon the costs of malpractice insurance, availability of

-

See id. In Kerins, the operating physician employed universal precautions and there was no evidence to suggest
that he sustained any cuts during the operation. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 174, 177 (Ct. App.
1994).
See Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
140
See Madrid, 122 N.M. at 276, 923 P.2d at 1161. The court supported its contention that such feats are reasonable
by citing N.M. Stat. Ann. 5 24-1-9.1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996) - a statute permitting the testing of persons convicted
of certain criminal offenses for sexually-transmitted diseases. See Madrid 122 N.M. at 276,923 P.2d at 1161 n.2.
The court reasoned that because the statute permits HIV testing of criminal sex offenders, the New Mexico
Legislature has recognized that "under circumstances in which a channel of transmission exists" fears in those
yersons potentially exposed to sexually transmitted disease are "to be expected." See id.
See id. at 277,923 P.2d at 1162.

-
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A".

I"

See id. (citing Trujillo v. City ofAlbuquerque. 110 N.M. 621,798 P.2d 571 (1990)).

'" 4
2 (emphasis added).
See id.
-'45

-

health care services, and the financial resources of defendants, the court responded that such
trepidations amount to unsupported c~njecture.'~'
TOthat end, the court remarked: "[blecause
important policy goals are firthered by recognizing a cause of action for emotional distress from
an invasive impact caused by negligence, we will not rely on unsubstantiated predictions of an

insurance crisis as grounds for defeating such a cause of action."'48

V. ANALYSIS & IMPLICATIONS
A.

The Madrid Decision Expands [he Impact Rule Beyond Traditional Bounds

1.

Misapplication of a Basic Tort Maxjm

The Madrid court treated their holding as nothing more than the reaffirmation of the basic
tort maxim: "[tlhe tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him."'49 This adage, however,
originated £rom and has been used to illustrate the "eggshell skull" or "thin-skulled" plaintiff
doctrine.'50 Under the eggshell skull doctrine the tortfeasor is liable for unforeseeable injuries,

,--.

but only to the extent that his negligent conduct has resulted in the a~a-avationof a pre-existing
conditi~n.'~'
This fundamental principle also exists under New Mexico law.'52 Additionally, the
rule applies equally to both emotional and physical injurie~."~

' 4 6 ~ a d r iv.
d Lincoln County Med. Ca., 122 N.M. 269,277,923 P.2d 1154,1162 (1996).
147
See id.
K a z 7 8 . 9 2 3 P.2d at 1163.
149 See id. at272, 923 P.2d at 1157 (quoting Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457,471,797 P.2d246,260 (1990)).
lieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901);
Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d
1366,1372 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The eggshell plaintiff rule simply means that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he fmds
hi.");Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 822 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The tortfeasor takes his victim as he
finds him . ..thatis the eggshell-skull rule."): Pierce v. General Motors Colp., 504 N.W.2d 648,656 (Mich. 1993)
("All first-year law students are taught that a tortfeasor 'takes his victim as he finds him,' and are given the example
of 'the man with the eggshell skull!); Casey v. Frederickson Motor Express Coy., 387 S.E.2d 177, 179 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1990) ("The thin skull rule is the rule of law that a negligent defendant takes the plaintiff as he fmds him . . .
.");Pace v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 594 N.E.2d 187, 188 (Ohio Ct. CI. 1991) ("This is the rule that the defendant
takes the plaintiff as he fmds him, or the 'thin skull' or 'eggshell skull' rule."); see generally Restatement (Second) of
39, 4 43, at 292, 5 54, at 363 11.37; 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence 5 500
Torts 8 461 (1964); Keeton, -note
(1989).
IS1
See Keeton,
note 39, 5 43, at 292; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages 5 922 & 11.67 (1989). Prior to Madrid, the only
casesthat have used the phrase "the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him"
to illustrate the eggshell doctrine
or the aggravation of a pre-existinginjury are Binns v. Fredendall, 513 N.E.2d 278,280 (Ohio 1987),
110
N.M. at 471,797 P.2d at 260, and HOD SO^ v. St. Mary's HoS~ital,408 A.2d 260,264 (Cow. 1979). The latter case
involved an action for loss of consortium. See Hoason, 408 A.2d at 264.
Is2 See Hebenstreit v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 65 N.M. 301,306,336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (1959); Martinez v.
~ e a z e , 9 6 N . M . 4 4 6 , 4 5 1 , 6 3 1P.2d 1314, 1319(Ct. App. 1 9 8 1 ) . ~ T h o m a s v . H e n s o n 102N.M.417,423,
,

see

-.~

m,

Application of the eggshell skull doctrine "does not create a new class of plaintiffs."'54

-

Rather, it merely prohibits a defendant from eluding liability where his negligent conduct results
in otherwise unforeseeable harm that would not have occurred but for the plaintiffs inherent
Therefore, under the eggshell skull rule a plaintiff predisposed to

susceptibility to

psychological trauma is not precluded from recovery for emotional distress resulting from a
physical injury just because an individual more nom~allyconstituted would not have suffered a
similar harm.'56Paradoxically, the Madrid court employed "eggshell skull" terminology despite
an absence of facts that the plaintiff possessed any predisposition to emotional harm or that the
defendant's conduct exacerbated any underlying preexisting conditions (emotional or physical),
if indeed the plaintiff had any. While the plaintiff in Madrid did have pre-existing paper cuts, no
explanation or analogous precedent was offered by the court to support the contention that
emotional distress represents an exacerbation or aggravation of this type of injury. In any case,
-

when the eggshell doctrine has been employed, at least the courts have ~equiredthat any injury
be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct.'57Attention to
proximate causation was lacking in the Madrid decision, however.
2.

A "Physical Impact" Resulting in an "Actual Exposrrre" Satisjies
Proximate Causation by Making the Fear of Contracting HIV Foreseeabte
and Reasonable
a

-.

The "Actual Exposure" Test Provides the Causal Nexus Between
Impact and Emotional Injury

696 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that a defendant is responsible for injuries sustained by a plaintiff
in a car accident, including aggravation of the plaintiffs pre-accident condition, limited to the extent that the
plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by not using a seat belt).
53 See, e.g, Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78,81 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[P]sychological vulnerability is on the same footing
with physical.").
IS4
..Morton v. Merrillville Toyota, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 781, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
1,)
See id.
IS&-SeeMKtinez, 96N.M.at 451,631 P.2dat 1319;Padgetv. Gray, 727 S.W.2d 706,711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
&Feeton,
note 39, 5 54, at 363 n.37.
'51
Whatley v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 351 So. 2d 850, 852 (La. Ct. App. 1977) ("[Tlhe tonfeasor
takes his victim as he finds him. However, a tortfeasor is liable only for the direct and proximate results of his
wrongful act.").

a,

-

For the Madrid court, the plaintiffs fear of developing .4IDS was the natural and
.-

probable consequence of suffering an impact with bloody fluid."' Without much rumination, the
&&dk
rJ

court decided that because a physical impact had occurred. the traditional rule applied:

"emotional injuries suffered by the victim of [a] tortious impact are recoverab~e."'~~
Physical
contact satisfied causation, reasoned the court, because it made the emotional harm resulting
from the Medical Center's negligent conduct foreseeable.16' In other words, conduct that results
in one being splashed with bloody fluid-ven
HIV-should

if it is unknown whether the fluid even contains

make an attendant fear of possibly developing AIDS foreseeable. In this regard,

the Madrid decision represents a throw back to the early "impact" cases that permitted recovery
pursuant to minor contacts that had no real part in causing the complained of harm.16'As noted
in Payton v. Abbott Labs, "[tlhat these classes of cases exist is not a sufficient basis for allowing
recovery, absent some additional element of satisfactow roof, for emotional distress which is

--

not a reasonably foreseeable result of a defendant's merely negligent condu~t."l~~
While courts have held that establishing proximate causation requires that the emotional
distress be reasonably foreseeable,I6' "[qoreseeability is only one element of [ca~sation]."'~~
Other considerations include "whether the relationship between cause and effect is too
atten~ated."'~~
Such considerations explain why the impact rule as applied by the Madrid court

'"
See Madrid v
159 -

-

Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,274,923 P.2d 1154, 1159 (1996).
Id. at 272,923 P.2d at 1157 (citing Marchica v. Long IslandR.R., 3 1 F.3d 1197, 1204 (2d Cir. 1994)). In
adopting the impact rule, the Madrid Court relied exclusively on the Folz and Marchica decisions. See Madrid, 122
N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159. Each of these cases involved plaintiffs that sustained phvsical iniuries resulting from
physical impacts, rather than just suffering physical impacts alone as was the case for the plaintiff in Madrid. See
Folz v. State, 1LO N.M. 457,461,797 P.2d 246,250 (1990), 4Marchica, 31 F.3d at L200: see also, supra notes
57-60 and accompanying text (discussing how courts and commentators have distinguished physical impact from
physical injury). In fact, the Marchica court noted that had the plaintiff "merely touched [a] discarded hypodermic
needle" instead of suffering an actual puncture wound injury "the case would stand on a d~fferentfooting."
Marchica, 3 1 F.3d at 1204.
I6%ee Madrid, 122 N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159 (citing Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180-81 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
161
See Keeton,
note 39, 5 54, at 363 & n.42.
I6'GN.E.2d 171, 180 (Mass. 1982) (emphasis added).
Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 17 (N.J. 1997).
Wyatt v. G~lmore,290 S.E2d 790,791 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
165
See id. See also Lopezv. Maez, 98 N.M. 625,630,651 P.2d 1269, 1274 (1982) (setting out the elements for
negligence and requir~ng"[a] reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury.").

u,

-25-

has been abandoned by the great majority of j~risdictions.'~~
While on the one hand, the rule has

-_

been criticized as imposing arbitrary limitations--denying recovery for genuine emotional
disturbance in the absence of physical ~ontact'~'--onthe other hand. it has been castigated when
invoked to permit recovery where the physical impact had but a tenuous causal connection to the
emotional harm.I6' Concerns over attenuated causation have resulted in a more reasoned
approach. For example, some courts have held that in order to recover under the impact n ~ l e
"[tlhe mental injury must be the natural and direct result of the plaintiffs physical injury."'69 The
same principle has even been espoused by the New Mexico courts when discussing the recovery
of general damages for mental pain and suffering as a consequence of physical injuries:
"damages are such as naturally and necessarily flow from the wrong act."'70 It seems axiomatic
then that some causal connection between the negligent impact and the mental injury must be

-

demonstrated before damages can be recovered.
In the "fear of future disease" context, actual exposure to the disease causing agent
itself-as

opposed to contact with something that &contain a disease causing agent-has

provided this necessary causal link between impact and emotional distress."' In these types of

See Fink, lr., w note 28, at 781 & n.18; -,
437 N.E.2d at I76 n.6 (noting that Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
~ e n G k yand
, Missouri still apply the traditional impact rule).
167
See Keeton,
note 39, 5 54, at 364.
I" 8-,
437 N.E.2d at 180; Fink, Jr., -note
28, at 781;
Keeton, w note 39, 5 54, at 364
( n o z g the "absurdity" in certain applications of the rule).
' 6 9 See,,Etienne v. Caputi, 679 N.E.2d 922,925 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579
N.E.2d 452,454 (Ind. 1991));
Williamson v. Bennett, 112 S.E.2d 48,52 (N.C. 1960) ("the emotional
disturbance. . .must be the natural and proximate result of the injury . . . ,"); W A , 290 S.E.2d at 791 ("A tortfeasor is liable to the injured party for all of the consequences which are the natural and direct result ofhis conduct.
.."); Luepke, w note 28, at 123 1("Under the [impact] rule, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
negligently caused the plaintiff to suffer a physical impact, and that the impact
and immediately resulted in
emotional distress.") (emphasis added); Zakarin, -note
45, at 267 ("While in a basic negligence action there
need only be a 'reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury,' in an action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, there must be a direct causal connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury which the plaintiff sustains."). The same has been expressed in cases analyzing "fear of AIDS"
claims. See,,Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (111. Ct. App. 1997) ("A plaintiff who has
suffered a physical impact and injury due to a defendant's negligence may recover for emotional distress that the
in'ury &g& causes.") (emphasis added).
17'See Higgins v. Hermes, 89 N.M. 379,381,552 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Mobile City Lines, Inc.
v. ~f;;ctor, 130 So. 2d 388 (Ala. 1961)).
17'
Dworkin, -note
78, at 546. -Neal
v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("[Iln the
reported cases permitting a plaintiff to recover for fear of cancer from exposure to carcinogens, the fact of exposure

see

see

.

-

cases, satisfaction of the impact rule has required m

f of ingestion, inhalation, or some other

more direct exposure to the identifiable carcinogen, contagion, or other disease causing entity to
By contrast, under the rationale from Madrid,
which plaintiffs fear they have been subje~ted."~
satisfaction of the impact rule only requires minimal contact with the possible conduit of disease
transmission, rather than impact with the disease-causing agent itself. For example, the plaintiff
in Madrid experienced an impact with bloody fluid (a potential conduit of disease transmission).

At the time of the incident it was unknown whether the fluid was even HIV-contaminated."' Yet
the plaintiffs cause of action for emotional distress was not dependent upon proof that she had
suffered an impact with, or actual exposure to, HIV.'" Impact with blood alone was sufficient.
In this regard, perhaps the Madrid decision is better characterized as a "fear of blood" case rather
than a "fear of AIDS" case."'
Such a holding invites ignorant claims. For example, under the Madrid reasoning

-

recovery would be permitted "for the fear of developing tuberculosis based on evidence that a
person had coughed in the plaintiffs face, or for fear of cancer where the plaintiff had inhaled or
ingested an unknown substance, all without any proof that a disease-causing agent was
present."'76 The basis for recovery in Madrid is even more attenuated: the bloody fluid to which

a

has
been established.") (emphasis added); Dmry v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668, 673-74
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) ("A common thread running through these cases is reflected in the requirement that the alleged
fear. . fmd its origin in actual exposure to a substance or condition capable of causing the feared disease or
malady.")
172
See Joseph C. Kearfon, et. al., Current Issues in Toxic Tort Litigation, SB73 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 1,25 (1997).
%?lummer
v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1978) (entrance of tubercle bacilli into the body constitutes an
impact); Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (drinking contaminated water
establishes impact); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (prenatal exposure
to DES satisfies impact); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (inhalation
of asbestos fibers constitutes impact). But Plummer v. Abbon Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920,927 (D.R.I. 1983)
(ingestion of DES not sufficient to establish impact).
I n See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,270,923 P.2d 1154, 1155 (1996).
id. at278,923 P.2d at 1163 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate just because actual exposure
had not been demonstrated).
175
In essence, the Madrid Court allowed recovery based upon a superficial contact that played "no part in causing
the real harm." See.,K e e t o n , m note 39, 5 54, at 363 & n.42.
'71 See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 88 1,889 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993). A more explicit example would be allowing recovery
forfear of cancer where the plaintiff inhaled dust particles while removing insulation from pipes in the basement of
an old home, without requiring proof that the inhaled dust actually contained asbestos fibers. SeeBurk v. Sage
Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285,288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("[Wlhile injuries stemming from a fear of contracting illness

.

-See

-~

-27-

the plaintiff was exposed might have contained HIV, which
.-

have been transmitted through

unhealed paper cuts, and which might have survived transmlsslon, &resulting in
sero~onversion.'~~
This represents a "possibility, based on a potential, based on a possibility."'78
To avoid such scenarios, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have required proof
of actual exposure to HIV.'79The two-pronged "actual exposure" test requires proof of both a
scientifically accepted channel of transmission and that the alleged conduit of transmission
actually contained HIV.'~'Courts adopting the actual exposure test have pointed out that "[tlo
recognize a cause of action . . .when the presence of HIV is not shown. . . is clearly unsound . . .
[flear in such situations may be genuine but it is based on speculation rather than fact."'st Much
like the "fear of future disease" precedent that spawned the actual exposure rule,la2cases
analyzing fear of AIDS claims also recognized that "[plerrnitt~ngrecovery of damages in tort for

-

fear of disease based solely upon an unproven supposition that exposure to a disease-causing
agent could have occurred, absent any facts showing that exposure did in fact occur, would run
afoul of the most basic tenets of tort law."183Put another way, fear of disease stemming only

after exposure to a diseasecausing agent may present compensable damages, injuries stemming fmm fear of the
initial exposure [incident] do not.").
177
Neal, 873 P.2d at 889 (presenting an analogous factual scenario).
17' See Doe v. Doe, 519N.Y.S.2d 595,599 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1987).
'79 &,
Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 121 N.M. 133, 138,909 P.2d 14, 19 (Ct. App. 1995) (listing
several jurisdictions that have adopted the "actual exposure" rule). SeeBrzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del.
1995); Rnssaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d253 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); Blair v. Elwoodunion Free Pub. Sch., 656
N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Montalbano v. Tri-Mac Enterprises, 652N.Y.S.2d 780 (App. Div. 1997);
Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880 (App. Div. 1996); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618 (Tenn. 1997); Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (additional
jurisdictions that have all adopted the actual exposure test).
180
See Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 886. However, some courts applying the aclual exposure test have not required
-direct proof that HIV was present in the conduit of transmission. See, e.&, Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 888. In those
instances where the alleged conduit of transmission is unavailable for HIV-testing, other evidence may be
note
introduced to demonstrate that HIV was present during the exposure incident. See id. See also Zakarin, =a
45, at 282 ("[Ilf the source of the possible contamination is unknown, then a fear of contracting AIDS will be
considered genuine.").
See Maica, 682 N.E.2d at 256 (quoting Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861,867 (La. Ct. App.
1 9 9 3 . SeeJohnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., lnc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991) ("[Blefore a
recovery for emotional distress damages may be made due to a fear of contracting a disease, such as AIDS, there
must fust be exposure to the disease. If there is not exposure, then emotional distress damages will be denied.")
182
See, supra
notes 89-90 and accompanvine text.
'a' Lauren J. Carnillo, Comment ~ d d j n e ~ uto; the Fire: Realistic Fears or Unrealistic Damages in AIDS Phobia
35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 331, 342 (1994). "There is insufficient authority in most jurisdictions to suppon the notion

a,

'"

-.

w,

from "the possibilitv of exposure is not a loss or detriment sufficient to create a legally
.-

compensable injury."ls4
But for the Madrid court, the fear of possibly contracting HIV under the particular
circumstances was a foreseeable one because the contact between bloody fluids and unhealed
Having the channel of
paper cuts provided a medically sound channel of transmi~sion.'~~
transmission requirement, surmised the court, made the second prong of the actual exposure
test-proof

that HIV is present-a

~
the existence of a
redundant limiting d e ~ i c e . ' 'Apparently,

viable mode of transmission was enough to "create a presumption of exposure."187However, if
the conduit of transmission does not contain HIV, the possibility of contracting HIV is probably
zero.3,188

r~

Nonetheless, even if the presence of HIV were to be presumed, it is debatable whether

-

unhealed paper cuts suffice as a medically

channel of transmission. For example, while

HIV may be transmitted through contact between HIV-infected blood and non-intact skin,
ninety-nine percent of all reported AIDS cases result from HIV transmission via sexual
Furthermore, the statistical
intercourse, intravenous drug abuse, or perinatal transmi~sion.'~~
probability of contracting HIV from a single needle stick injury--inarguably
impact than that suffered by the plaintiff inMA-assuming

a more invasive

the needle was contaminated, is

approximately 0.3 to 0.5 percent.'p0 Even HIV transmission in the health care setting is
extremely rare. To date, no cases of HIV transmission from a physician to a patient have been
reported, and the theoretical risk of HIV transmission from an infected health care worker to a

-

that fear of contracting a disease is a compensable injury when there are no facts to show that an 'exposure' to the
disease-causing agent or an 'exposure-causing event ever occurred." Id.at 346.
Is4 Id. at 346-347 (emphasis added).
I8"e
Madrid v Lincoln County Med. C&.,122 N.M. 269,276,923 P.2d 1154,1161 (1996).
186See ~ dat. 277, 923 P.2d at 1162.
187-See id. at 274, 923 P.2d at 1159 (quoting Williamson v Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1180 011.5. Super. Ct. App.
-Div. 1996)).
I88
Russaw v. Manin, 472 S.E.2d 508,511 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) ("[Tlhe statistical probability of contracting
HIV from a non-HIV contaminated needle is zero . . .")
189
See K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553,558-59 & n.8 (Minn. 1995).
-

.

patient, or visa versa during an invasive procedure is remote.19' Finally, even if a person is
,-

exposed to HIV-infected blood or blood-products, the transmission of HIV is not certain to
occur.'92 Such information underscores the fact that the risk of contracting HIV from minor
contacts is practically a statistical nullity. As noted by the Court in Doe v. Northwestern
University: "[Elven a foreseeable fear of deadly disease may not be compensable if the feared
contingency is too unlikely."'93
b. The ''Actual Exposure" Test Assures That Fears Are Reasonable
In addition to making emotional distress foreseeable, the actual exposure test also

. the statistical improbability
satisfies causation by ensuring that one's fear is reasonable. 194 Given
of contracting HIV from incidental contacts, the absence of proof of exposure to HIV during the
Undoubtedly,
alleged transmission incident makes the fear of developing AIDS unrea~onable.'~~
there are instances where individuals fearing a possible exposure to HIV develop symptomology
Z-

reflecting the genuineness of their emotional distress.'96 But it is not a question of whether the
fear is genuine, rather it is a matter of whether the fear is reasonab~e.'~'The reasonableness
standard requires that a plaintiff who fears developing AIDS possess "that level of knowledge of
the disease that is then-current, accurate, and generally available to the

This rule

places an affirmative duty on individuals seeking recovery for fear of AIDS to take some

See DeMilio v. Schrager, 666 A 2 d 627,630 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995).

19'G
Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1263 (4th Cir. 1995); K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559

C-

n.8Zittler & Rennert, =a
note 30, at 1317. But Robert C. Gombar, AIDS in the Workolace: Selected Leaal
&, 350 PLIiLit 103, 154-55 (discussing studies that documented the transmission of HIV from patients to
healthcare workers).
See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559 n.8.
193
682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (111. Ct. App. 1997). See also Russaw, 472 S.E.2d at 512 (noting that damages can not be
based on "imagined possibilities.")
l9'See DeMilio, 666 A.2d at 632; Brown v. New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 648 N.Y.S.2d 880,887 (App.
Div. 1996).
195
See Brown, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 887. Of course, a positive HIV test would be prima facie proof of reasonable fear.
-See
id. at 886.
-196
Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881,887 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (discussing how patients fearing exposure to
HIV may experience welght loss, loss of sleep, and other symptomatic complamts).
"'
See id.
198 -See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,21 (N.J. 1997)
-

a,

A-

responsibility in educating themselves about the acceptable modes of HIV transmission and the

--

realistic risks of developing AIDS

19'

Thls "self-education" requirement has not been viewed as

unfair or unduly harsh given the widespread public information campaigns that have made such
. ~ ~ ~ the requirement, recovery for fear
information readily accessible, if not u n a v ~ l d a b l eAbsent
of AIDS would reward ignorant beliefs about HIV transmission and the likelihood of developing

AIDS.~" The inference being that reasonable persons would not fear developing AIDS unless
there was proof of actual exposure to HIV Several courts have found, therefore, that absent
proof of actual exposure to HIV, any fear of developing AIDS is, as a matter of law,
unreasonable.202
In Madrid, however. the court considered one's fear of AIDS resulting from contact
between bloody fluid and unhealed paper cuts reasonable, regardless of proof of actual HIV

-

exposure.203Ironically, in support of its position, the court referenced part of the New Mexico
"Public Health A C ~ , " ~which
'~
permits victims of sexual assaults to request that their conv~cted
assailants be tested for the presence of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV.~" The coun
deemed the statute a recognition by the legislature that fears are to be expected in those persons
potentially exposed to HIV under circumstances in which a medically sound channel of
transmission exists.206To the contrary, unlike Madrid, the statute enacted by the New Mexico

-~

See id. at 22 (citing Shahvari, =a
note 34, at 794). It has been suggested that such arule "effectively requires
-plaintiffs to mitigate their fears by learning what they can about the likelihood that they have contracted" HIV. See
Majca v. Beekil, 682 N.E.2d 253,256 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
See Williamson, 696 A.2d at 22.
"'See M,682 N.E.2d at 255; Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145, 151 (111. Ct. App. 1997).
~ i & s o n , 696 A.2d at 20 (discussing how the objective reasonableness standard does not effectively counteract
i norance because it does not directly address the availability of accurate information about H N and AIDS).
2gSee Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Del. 1995); Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508,512 (Ga. Ct.
~pp.1996);Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618,624 (Tenn. 1997); Drury v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d
668,675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
203
See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M. 269,276,923 P.2d 1154, 1161 (1996).
2M
See N.M. Stat. Ann. @24-1-1, -1-9.1(A), -1-9.2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1996)
205 See Madrid 122 N.M. at 276,923 P2d at 1161 n.2. (referencing N.M.Stat. Ann. §$24-1-9.1 (A), -1-9.2(A)
-(Repl. Pamp. 1996)).
'06 -See id.

-

Legislature does not "presume" exposure.207Instead, it permits

,--.

of convicted assailants to

determine whether they are, in fact, HIV-infected, thus providing for a reliable assessment of the
threat of actual exposure posed to

victim^.'^' Under the Madrid decision, recovery for fear of

AIDS would be permitted where a sexual assault involves criminal penetration because the act
would involve both a physical impact and a medically sound method of transmission. Therefore,
the court's use of the statute to illustrate that actual exposure is unnecessary to demonstrate the
reasonableness of one's fear is paradoxical.
Finally, the court concluded that one's fear of developing AIDS absent proof of actual
exposure to HIV was reasonable because of "the existing circumstances and the realities of the
time" taking into consideration "reasonable reactions of real people."209Apparently, it is not
unreasonable to fear contracting HIV from blood or medical waste, even absent proof of the
presence of HIV, particularly in "light of common knowledge.'"10 Unfortunately, this attitude
serves to proliferate social stigmas and irrational phobias rather than justify legitimate claims.
Public misconceptions regarding the transmission of HIV and the cause of AIDS should not be
permitted to SeNe as a substitute for objective proof.

B.

Policy Considerations Favor Adopting a Rule That Minimizes Social Stigmas and
Public Phobias

Anxiety arising from the possibility of contracting HIV and developing AIDS generally
Furthermore,
reflects public misperceptions, misinformation, and ignorance about the di~ease.~"
ignorance about HIV and AIDS promotes hysteria and irrational fears, as well as prejudice,
For example, most people
stigmatization and discrimination against those infected with HIV.'~~
still believe that HIV can be transmitted through casual contact, that AIDS remains primarily a

-

-See id. at 274, 823 P.2d at 1159 ("[Tlhe conduct is such to create a presllmption of exposure . . . .")(quoting
Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179, 1181 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
'08 See N.M. Stat. Ann. 5 24-1-9.2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1997).
'09 -See Madrid 122 N.M. at 274,923 P.2d at 1159 (quoting W~lliamson,677 A.2d at 1181).
&id. (quoting Williamson, 677 A.2d at 1181).
See Chadwick,
note 63, at 159.
'07

-

"gay disease," and that AIDS, not heart disease or cancer, represents the number one health
problem in the nation.213Not surprisingly then, public misconceptions and social stigmas
associated with AIDS have resulted in unsubstantiated fears arising from benign incidents
resulting in an influx of fear of AIDS

Generalized ignorance and social stigmas

surrounding AIDS implicate serious public policy concerns that compel adoption of the actual
exposure rule because "[bly permitting plaintiffs to recover for mental anxiety over fear of AIDS
in the absence of actual exposure, we risk fueling misperceptions about AIDS and how it is
tran~rnitted."~'~
Public policy reasons in support of requiring proof of actual exposure were
perhaps best expressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Brzoska v. Olson:
AIDS is a disease that spawns widespread public misperception
based upon the dearth of knowledge concerning HIV transmission.
Indeed, plaintiffs rely upon the degree of public misconception
about AIDS to support their claim that their fear was reasonable.
To accept this argument is to contribute to the phobia. Were we to
recognize a claim for the fear of contracting AIDS based upon a
mere allegation that one
have been exposed to HIV, totally
unsupported by any medical evidence or factual proof, we would
open a Pandora's Box of "AIDS-phobia" claims by individuals
whose ignorance, unreasonable suspicion or general paranoia cause
them apprehension over the slightest of contact with HIV-infected
individuals or objects. Such plaintiffs would recover for their fear
of AIDS, no matter how irrational . . . the better approach is to
assess the reasonableness of a plaintiffs fear of AIDS according to
the plaintiff's &-not
potential-exposure to H I V . ~ ' ~
The Madrid court failed to devote even a single sentence to any of these policy concerns.
Instead, the court declared that its decision would serve as an incentive to decrease the number of
negligent exposwe incidents, thereby serving the "laudable goal of promoting public health."217

213

-

See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14,21 (N.J. 1997).
See Fink, Jr.,
note 28, at 803 & 1111.164-67.

*"See DeMilio v. Schrager, 666 A.2d 627,630 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995).
"'See Fink, Jr., anote 28, at 803 (emphasis in original).
668 A.2d 1355, 1363 (Del. 1995).

See Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 122 N.M.269,277,923 P.2d 1154, 1162 (1996). SeeTerry C. Gay
z F. Rosato,
e
Combatino Fear of Future Inium and Medical Monitoring Claims, 61 Def. Couns. J. 554,557
(1994) (citing Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 630 So. 2d 861, 868-69 (La. Ct. App. 1994)) (supporting
recoplition of a duty not to expose others to a disease in order to reduce its spread).

7I'

&~

More realistically, the Madrid decision will serve the opprobrious goal of rewarding ignorance
f.

and promoting public misconceptions about HIV and AIDS.

VI. CONCLUSION
In Madrid, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized for the first time a cause of action
for negligent infliction of emotional distress for fear of developing AIDS arising from possible
exposure to HIV. The decision formally recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress outside the bystander-liability context. The Madrid court adopted the
traditional impact rule, permitting recovery for emotional injuries resulting from a tortious
impact, provided a medically sound channel of transmission exists. In doing so, the court
rejected the "actual exposure" limiting device adopted by the majority of jurisdictions. The
decision will do little to deter unreasonable conduct, but will go a long way in reinforcing social
stigmas and public phobias about HIV and AIDS.
ERIC J. KNAPP

